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The protection of data transmitted over the space-link is an issue of growing importance 
also for civilian space missions. Through the Consultative Committee for Space Data 
Systems (CCSDS), space agencies have reacted to this need by specifying the Space Data-
Link Layer Security (SDLS) protocol which provides confidentiality and integrity services 
for the CCSDS Telemetry (TM), Telecommand (TC) and Advanced Orbiting Services (AOS) 
space data-link protocols. This paper describes the approach of the CCSDS SDLS working 
group to specify and execute the necessary interoperability tests. It first details the 
individual SDLS implementations that have been produced by ESA, NASA, and CNES and 
then the overall architecture that allows the interoperability tests between them. The paper 
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reports on the results of the interoperability tests and identifies relevant aspects for the 
evolution of the test environment. 
I. Introduction 
NFORMATION security is becoming more and more important for space agencies and spacecraft operators in 
general. With ubiquitous connectivity and cheap communication technology, the threat related to malicious 
attacks on spacecraft operation infrastructures is increasing.  The Space-Link supports the critical telecommand and 
telemetry communications between the spacecraft and the ground segments. In an overall Space Mission Security 
Architecture the protection of the space link is, therefore, a key priority. Threats to this link can affect the command 
and monitoring of the spacecraft being supported or the instrument data being downlinked. Attacks can range from 
illegal interception of the communications and the data being transmitted (eavesdropping) to attempt to masquerade 
and, therefore, take unauthorized control of the spacecraft (spoofing) or deny service to both the spacecraft and the 
mission control system (e.g. RF jamming). 
Most civilian spacecraft operators are using the command & control protocol suite provided by the Consultative 
Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS). Since this protocol suite is currently not supporting the provision of 
security services (i.e. confidentiality & integrity), space links are not secured at all or secured using proprietary 
implementations. During the recent years CCSDS has been developing the Space-Data Link Layer Security Protocol 
(SDLS) to close this gap11. The SDLS protocol is conceptually completed but in order to be published as a standard 
it needs to be validated through at least two independent implementations interoperating with each other. These 
interoperability implementations and testing campaigns have been completed by three different agencies – CNES, 
ESA, and NASA. 
 In our paper, we briefly introduce the SDLS protocol, which has been covered by other publications already1,2, 
and then focus on the interoperability testing process and results. We describe in detail the approach to the testing 
and the test cases, the individual implementations and their operational environment, and the actual test execution 
also in the light of a successful co-operation between multiple space agencies. We also provide important lessons-
learned that will reduce the complexity of future interoperability tests.  
A. The Space Data Link Security (SLDS) Protocol 
Protecting the space link implies protecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of the space 
communications links and the telecommand and telemetry data being exchanged. As a matter of fact, priority has 
been given to the protection of the confidentiality and integrity of these data. In particular, with the specification and 
integration of security services like authentication, encryption and authenticated encryption through the SDLS 
protocol the space missions’ community have a modular solution to the protection of some of the main threats on the 
space link. Threats like spoofing and eavesdropping can be mitigated by implementing the desired SDLS services on 
the space link. 
 SDLS is compatible with the well-known and widely deployed CCSDS Space Data Link protocols: 
Telecommand (TC)3, Telemetry (TM)4 and Advanced Orbiting Systems (AOS)5. Furthermore, it is both compatible 
to a certain extent, and reliant on, the application of the CCSDS Space Link Extension (SLE) services6 to effectively 
extend the protection to the end-to-end data communications between spacecraft and mission control system. With 
complementary protection of the ground communications network between the ground station(s) and the mission 
control system as well as the mission control system itself and its interfaces with end users, a complete Space 
Mission Security Architecture is achieved. 
B. Interoperability Testing 
CCSDS requires at least two independent implementations that are able to successfully complete a series of end-
to-end interaction test cases as prerequisite for the publication of technical standards. The CCSDS SDLS working 
group defined the necessary test cases to validate the protocol.  
However, the testing itself did not prove to be a straight-forward task. One major problem is the fact that not all 
space agencies are using the full CCSDS Space Data-Link (SDL) communication protocol suite that is protected by 
SDLS. As an example, some NASA missions e.g. Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) are mainly working 
with TC/AOS, while ESA and CNES are using the TM/TC protocols for the command & control of robotic 
spacecraft. Thus, a baseline implementation was not easily identified for the interoperability implementations. 
Furthermore, since SDLS is a space-link protocol, not only the ground systems side needs implementation, but an 
additional implementation is required for spacecraft simulators as well in order to support end-to-end testing. 
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Finally, the SDLS protocol supports a large number of configurations e.g. in terms of supported crypto algorithms, 
crypto periods etc. It is not possible to test all these configurations. Thus, the concept of a baseline mode has been 
introduced. It is a standard configuration in which the protocol is assumed to be deployed. In this paper, we describe 
each of these issues in more detail. 
 Taking into account all these constraints, CNES, ESA, and NASA agreed to develop prototype implementations 
of the SDLS protocol and then set up an interoperability testing environment. We describe all three implementations 
in detail as well as the full interoperability test setup, execution and results. 
C. Lessons Learned 
 The definition and execution of the interoperability test for the SDLS protocol was more challenging than 
initially thought. Besides a number of technical reasons that are mentioned in this paper (baseline mode, ground and 
space implementations, varying protocol support), the execution of a test, especially a real-time test, between 
agencies is a challenging task in terms of management and network security concerns. One of the recommendations 
that were born out of this exercise is the establishment of a testing cloud/ environment for CCSDS. While the setup 
of such a testing environment brings a number of challenges, once in place, it could significantly simplify the 
interoperability testing not only for security protocols. 
D. Paper Structure 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly introduce the Space Data Link 
Security (SDLS) Protocol, putting emphasis and motivation and technical implementation. Section III focuses on the 
interoperability testing, presenting each implementation (ESA, NASA, CNES), but also discussing the overall 
testing infrastructure. Section IV is concerned with lessons-learned and will outline a potential test bed proposal for 
future interoperability testing setups. Finally, Section V concludes the paper and provides an outline of future work.  
 
II. The Space Data Link Security 
(SDLS) Protocol 
Currently, there are no security 
standards for the bulk of civilian space 
missions where there is a single spacecraft 
in contact with its control center through a 
ground station. This topology is illustrated 
in Fig. 1.  In such as case, if uplink 
command authentication and/or downlink 
payload data confidentiality is required, up 
to this point each mission has had to invent 
its own solution. As a result, space agencies 
realized that a standardized concept to 
integrate security on space missions with a 
simple network topology could be 
developed for use at the data link layer, thus 
avoiding individual project ad-hoc  
solutions and delivering the benefits of 
standardization. The Consultative 
Committee for Space Standardization (CCSDS) specified that such a standard should be usable with existing 
CCSDS telecommand (TC), telemetry (TM), and advanced orbiting systems (AOS) SDL standards without 
modification. The aim of the link layer security standard development is to allow security services to be used with 
TC, TM, and AOS without forcing any reengineering of those standards, which are in wide use by many missions 
and planned for many upcoming missions. 
Following an identification and analysis of requirements and constraints, major goals and drivers and some 
implementation issues, a Space Data Link Security (SDLS) protocol has been developed. The SDLS protocol 
implements an additional security sub-layer tightly integrated between the Data Link and Network layers of the 
International Standards Organization Open Systems Interconnection (ISO/OSI) model.  
A. SDLS – Requirements 
 
Figure 1. Space-Link Topology. The Figure illustrates a simple 
space-link topology as is used for most space missions today. The 
upper section depicts the payload data distribution and the lower 
part the housekeeping and commanding segment. 
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The main requirements of the SDLS protocol are to protect the services offered by the CCSDS SDL protocols. 
An overview on which user services are protected (mandatory or optional) is provided in Fig. 2. In terms of security 
objectives, the SDLS protocol supports (for 
both commanding and telemetry data) three 
security services: Authentication, Encryption 
and Authenticated Encryption. 
B. SDLS – Key Drivers 
The following key drivers had a direct 
impact on the design of the SDLS protocol: 
 1) Compatibility with SDL protocols: A 
minimum impact, ideally none, to existing SDL 
protocols is sought. In fact, a good modularity 
between the existing implementations of the 
SDL protocols (TM, TC and AOS) and the 
SDLS protocol is envisaged, thus limiting the 
impacts of inserting security protocol in 
existing TM/TC ground infrastructure and on-
board equipment. 
 2) Compatibility with SLE services: The 
currently defined and specified SLE services 
rely on their ability to identify and process SDL 
frames or parts of it for further processing and 
transfer between the SLE end points. The 
application of security services (e.g., confidentiality) at the SDL protocol with the new SDLS may impact the SLE 
service ability to ‘read’ and process the SDL frames, and in turn, the SLE service compatibility with SDLS. This 
impact is sought to be minimized. 
3) Modularity : The SDLS protocol shall offer modularity in selecting security services in accordance with the 
risk specifics and management decision of a given flight project. In order to support the application of such 
modularity guidelines will be provided in choosing security services in an accompanying document. 
4) Algorithm Independence: The CCSDS has established recommendations for cryptographic algorithms8. The 
SDLS protocol will support those recommended 
algorithms but should also provide sufficient flexibility 
to allow the incorporation of operator-specific 
cryptographic algorithms or future algorithms 
replacing the currently recommended due to 
obsolescence This is particularly important for 
authentication where length of message authentication 
codes (MACs) may evolve in order to cope with 
increasing threats. 
5) Interoperability: Interoperability plays a key role 
in CCSDS work. In some missions the Launch and 
Early Orbit Phase (LEOP) operations are outsourced to 
other specialized spacecraft operators. Once the LEOP 
phase is concluded the satellite is handed over to its 
main operator. The adoption of a standardized SDLS 
may ease the implementation of secure LEOP 
operations. Furthermore, there are other mission 
scenarios where a satellite developed by agency A is 
routinely operated by agency B from its own control 
center. 
C. SDLS – Main Concepts 
In the following, we will outline the main design concepts that were implemented in the SDLS protocol.  
1) Security Association: The concept of Security Association (SA), borrowed from IPSec7 but somewhat adapted 
to space communications, is crucial to the SDLS protocol. The selected security services for SDLS are implemented 
Figure 2. Protected SDL user services.  
 
Figure 3. OSI vs. CCSDS layers and SDLS security 
functions position. 
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with cryptographic algorithms and functions. The SDLS protocol provides SAs for defining the cryptographic 
parameters to be used by both the sending and receiving ends of a communications session, and for maintaining state 
information for the duration of the session. The SA defines a simplex (one-way), stateful cryptographic session for 
providing authentication, data integrity, replay protection, and/or data confidentiality. All Transfer Frames that share 
the same SA on a physical channel constitute a Secure Channel. Once an SA is created, the authentication and/or 
encryption algorithms specified, along with their modes of operation, are fixed and cannot be changed for the 
duration of the SA. 
2) Protocol Position in the CCSDS stack: The objective of the SDLS protocol development is to add a security 
function at the data link layer of space links using either one of the CCSDS space data link protocols. The relation of 
CCSDS protocol layers with OSI (Open Systems Interconnection model of ISO) layers, together with position of 
SDLS security functions are depicted in Fig. 3. Two sub-layers of the Data Link layer are defined for CCSDS space 
link protocols: data link protocol sub-layer, and synchronization & channel coding sub-layer. SDLS protocol and 
functions are part of the CCSDS data link protocol sub-layer and fully integrated in the TC, TM and AOS data link 
protocols. SDLS functions insert themselves inside the stack of functions of CCSDS data link protocols. SDLS 
protocol is not as such a distinct sub-layer but rather a set of additional security features for existing data link 
protocols. Each of those data link protocols provides a set of communication services. SDLS protects only part of 
those services as shown in Fig. 2.   
3) Protocol Data Structures: The SDLS encapsulates application-layer data carried in Space Data Link Protocol 
transfer frames between a Security Header and Trailer.  The Security Header and Trailer contain the contextual 
information necessary to perform decryption and/or integrity verification at the receiving end.  This contextual 
information does impose some additional transmission overhead; the sender must ensure that the overall length of 
the transfer frame does not exceed the maximum allowed by the underlying Space Data Link Protocol.  The amount 
of overhead will depend upon the options chosen for each Security Association.   
III. SDLS Interoperability Testing 
In this paragraph, which constitutes our main contribution, we describe the process of the interoperability testing 
that was applied for the SDLS protocol. We start with discussing the testing requirements and argue why it is 
necessary to define a baseline configuration for the protocol in order to be able to perform the testing. We will then 
introduce the three different and independent SDLS implementations that have been created by three agencies before 
describing the overall interoperability testing setup, execution and results. 
A. Overall Testing Requirements 
CCSDS requires the testing campaigns for new standard to comply with a few minimal requirements. In 
particular, it requires at least two independent implementations of the protocol that are able to communicate and 
work with each other. In addition, the SDLS working group has specified a number of additional requirements for 
the SDLS interoperability testing campaign. The aim of the test campaign is to validate the completeness, 
correctness and interoperability of the SDLS protocol. 
It is critical that the testing is representative and thus that it is executed in an “operational-like” environment or 
test bed. Since the SDLS protocol is fully embedded in three different types of space-link protocols (TM, TC, and 
AOS), it is necessary to test all three of them with SDLS. It is also important to validate that the SDLS protocol 
implementation does not interfere or interact with the transmission error control procedures (e.g. COP-19). As such, 
the injection of transmission and security errors during test execution is necessary, thus further increasing the 
complexity of the test setup. 
The test execution could be performed in a single laboratory by one test bed using multiple independent 
implementations of SDLS protocol.  However, optimally the testing should be conducted between the reference 
implementations of different agencies.  
In the following, we first describe the SDLS baseline mode, which is the common SDLS configuration used by 
all implementations. Then we present the three different reference implementations that have been implemented by 
ESA, NASA, and CNES. Finally, we describe the overall interoperability testing architecture, the test execution and 
the results. 
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B. SDLS Baseline Mode 
One of the key design 
drivers (see Section II.B) for 
the SDLS protocol is 
flexibility and algorithm 
independence. This means 
that the protocol can be 
operated with the 
recommended CCSDS 
algorithms8 or with other 
encryption, authentication, 
and authenticated encryption 
algorithms. This flexibility makes testing of the SDLS protocol very difficult and with all possible combinations 
certainly impossible. For this reason, it was agreed to define a so called Baseline Mode (See Appendix E of the 
SDLS standard11), which represents the suggested/standard configuration of the SDLS protocol. This means it is 
recommended to use the protocol in this configuration. In addition to testing, this also eases interoperability which is 
one of the design drivers of the protocol. In the following we will describe the baseline modes that have been 
established for SDLS use which each of the underlying data-link layer protocols. All three baseline mode 
configurations are implementing the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with different modes of operation as 
specified in the CCSDS crypto algorithms book8. The security header and trailer configuration for all three modes in 
shown in Fig. 4. 
 
For TM, the chosen AES mode is Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) which provides Authenticated Encryption. The 
specific configuration is as follows: 
• The key length is 128 bit, 
• The input initialization vector is 96 bit, where all of these bits are transmitted in-line in the Initialization 
Vector field of the Security Header, 
• The output Message Authentication Code (MAC) is 128 bit long. 
 
For TC, the chosen AES mode is Cipher-Based Message Authentication (CMAC) which provides 
Authentication. The specific configuration is as follows: 
• The key length is 128 bit, 
• The anti-replay sequence is 32 bits long, where all of these bits are transmitted in-line in the Sequence 
Number field of the Security Header, 
• The output MAC is 128 bit long. 
 
For AOS, the chosen AES mode is GCM (Authenticated Encryption). The specific configuration is as follows: 
• The key length is 128 bit, 
• The input initialization vector is 96 bit, where all of these bits are transmitted in-line in the Initialization 
Vector field of the Security Header, 
• The output MAC is 128 bit long. 
C. Interoperability Test Cases 
In order to satisfy the testing requirements, the SDLS working group has devised a number of test cases that 
need to be executed and successfully completed as part of the interoperability testing campaign10. Each of the test 
cases defines also the configuration parameters for the two SDLS implementations that are used. This includes for 
example the SA setup, authentication bit mask settings (mask used to select additional authenticated data in the 
Transfer Frame Header), anti-replay window size and others. The following test cases have been devised: 
1) Test Case 1: SDLS Protocol Validation over TC SDL protocol: This test case validates the SDLS specification 
for TC in the baseline mode. The first part of this test consists of the validation under nominal conditions. For this, 
 
Figure 4. Security Header and Trailer configurations for SDLS baseline mode. 
The Figure shows the configurations of the security header and trailer according to 
the SDLS baseline mode for TM, TC, and AOS data-link layer protocols. 
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standard test telecommands are generated, protected as per baseline mode configuration, and then send to the 
(simulated) spacecraft. Following this, also non-nominal TC security processing is tested. In particular, 
telecommands with manipulated MACs, telecommmands that violate the anti-replay counter window, and replayed 
commands are injected. The SDLS protocol shall be able to detect these anomalies and ground-space configuration 
mismatches.  
2) Test Case 2: SDLS Protocol/COP-1 Compatibility Check: It is important to ensure that the SDLS protocol is 
not interfering with other protocols that have similar, but different functionalities.  In particular, this applies to the 
COP-1 protocol (in charge of detecting transmission errors & retransmitting frames if errors detected). The purpose 
of this test case is to validate that no interference exists between the SDL TC/COP-1 protocols  and the SDLS 
protocol (in charge of detecting security errors). To achieve this, a number of errors (both transmission and security) 
are injected into protected TC transfer frames. In order to pass the test, these errors should be successfully detected 
by the right protocol instance (SDLS for security errors or COP-1 for transmission errors). Also, it needs to be 
guaranteed that e.g. a security error does not have an impact on the COP-1 protocol instance and vice versa.  
3) Test Case 3: SDLS Protocol Validation over TM SDL protocol: This test case validated the SDLS 
specification for TM in the baseline mode. It contains nominal telemetry frames as well as injected mistakes to 
understand whether the implementation is able to correctly detect exceptions and ground-space configuration 
mismatches. Also, this test case validates the possibility to maintain a mix of secure (SDLS protected) virtual 
channels and non-protected virtual channels. This means that multiple virtual channels will be used at the same time, 
some protected, some not. This test will help to identify possible interference. 
4) Test Case 4: SDLS Protocol Validation over AOS SDL protocol: This test case validated the SDLS 
specification for AOS in the baseline mode. It contains nominal AOS frames as well as injected mistakes to 
understand whether the implementation is able to correctly detect exceptions and ground-space configuration 
mismatches. 
D. ESA SDLS Implementation Prototype 
 
The ESA test environment for the SDLS protocol is part of the SpaceSecLab at ESAs Operations Center (ESOC) 
and implements an end-to-end communication chain between the mission control system and the spacecraft. This 
environment is fully representative, except that instead of a real spacecraft an operational simulator is used to 
implement the space segment part of the system. All subsystems that are usually used in an ESA mission operations 
infrastructure have been used for the SDLS testing as well. Fig. 5 provides an overview of all the subsystems used in 
the test bed and the interfaces they are using.  
In this test bed, telecommands are generated by ESA’s Mission Control System (MCS), SCOS-2000. The 
commands are then routed to the security unit which applies SDLS security services (confidentiality, authentication, 
or authenticated encryption). The security processed telecommands are sent back to the MCS, where they finish the 
encoding process. They are then sent to the Network Interface System (NIS), which uses the Space Link Extension 
(SLE) services protocol6 to further communicate the encoded commands to the Telemetry and Telecommand 
System (TMTCS), which in a real setup would be located at the ground station. The TMTCS would interface with 
the ground station systems and ensure radiation of commands to the spacecraft. For the simulated spacecraft 
environment however, the TMTCS is simply forwarding the commands to the simulator instance (GSTVi). The 
GSTVi interfaces with the onboard security unit to apply again the necessary security functions. The same 
processing chain applies to telemetry, the difference being  that the source is the spacecraft and the sink is the 
mission control system. Since only frame-level SLE services are used (F-CLTU, R-CF, R-OCF, and R-AF), the 
 
Figure 5. ESA end-to-end SDLS test bed. 
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security services are completely transparent to intermediate entities such as the ground station. 
 
The security unit implementation does not only process the data, it is also managing the security associations i.e. 
the secure space-link channels and their configuration. Settings such as cryptographic key in use, crypto algorithm, 
authentication bit mask, etc. can be configured here. This makes it easy to configure an end-to-end SDLS setup in 
the absence of standardized procedures for security association and key management (such procedures will be 
introduced in the CCSDS SDLS Extended Procedures Blue Book which is currently under development). 
Furthermore, also test tools are included. The security unit test configuration allows injecting a variety of errors that 
the protocol should be able to detect. Examples include an invalid anti-replay counter value, a MAC mismatch, etc.). 
All error test cases that are specified in the SDLS Test Report10 are supported. 
In order to support interoperability testing, the current version of the ESA reference implementation can be 
injected with recorded binary TM/TC SDL frames from another reference implementation. Security association and 
key management configuration information has to be agreed beforehand. More information is provided in Section 
III.G below when we discuss the inter-agency testing. 
ESA is currently in the process of upgrading its SDLS test environment to allow online interoperability testing in 
the context of the cloud deployment (see Section IV.B) and also to implement the draft SDLS Extended Procedures 
for a number of initial tests. 
E. NASA Test bed  
NASA’s test bed for SDLS was developed at the John McBride Software Testing and Research (JSTAR) 
Laboratory within NASA’s Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program in Fairmont, West Virginia. 
The JSTAR Lab contains simulations for many of NASA’s current missions and JSTAR contains the domain 
knowledge, expertise, and infrastructure to support ground and spacecraft simulations. JSTAR provided an ideal 
environment to implement the SDLS prototype and support the SDLS interoperability testing.  
NASA’s approach for developing the prototype for testing the SDLS protocol was to reuse existing NASA 
operational ground and flight systems/simulators. Using existing systems provided two benefits: reduction in time to 
implement (due to software reuse) and applicability after prototype was completed. Upon completion of the 
prototype, future NASA missions will be able to take the lessons learned from the prototype and apply them to their 
mission when implementing SDLS. 
 
Figure 6. Overall NASA Prototype Architecture.  
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The GPM Operational Simulator (GO-SIM) was the starting point for NASA’s development of a SDLS 
prototype.  GO-SIM is a pure software based simulator that uses the GPM ground system (ASIST), ground system 
command and telemetry databases, emulated RAD750 Single Board Computer (SBC), and unmodified GPM flight 
software binaries. GO-SIM is not a wall clock “real time” model.  There is 
no hardware (e.g., SpaceWire, MIL-STD1553) in the loop.  The flight 
software communicates the TM/AOS protocols over a simulated SpaceWire 
network and MIL-STD-1553 busses.  Even though events are marked and 
seem to be running from the model in “real time,” the simulation may run 
faster or slower (depending on the level of activity) relative to wall clock 
real time. 
In an effort to reduce code duplication, a simple cross-platformsecurity 
library was developed to be used in both the ground and spacecraft systems. 
Due to limited memory on the spacecraft hardware, the library was to be 
kept as compact as possible.  
Based on Annex E of the SDLS standard11, Baseline Implementation Mode, the library supports the following 
capabilities to support the modes for each of the Space Data Link Protocols: 
 
• Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm. 
• Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) for authentication, 
o Based on AES algorithm with 128-bit keys, 
o 32-bit Anti-Replay Sequence Number, 
o 128-bit output Message Authentication Code (MAC). 
• Galois Counter Mode (GCM) for authenticated encryption. 
o Based on AES algorithm with 128-bit keys, 
o 96-bit Initialization Vector, 
o 128-bit output MAC. 
 
The base library will be composed of 
three layers:  
• AES Core 
o The AES Core layer 
will provide the 
forward and reverse 
encryption 
procedures, 
supporting 128-bit 
keys. 
• CMAC and GCM Layers. 
• SDLS Layer 
o Contains support for SDLS-related constructs (e.g., Security Association (SA), Authentication 
Masks). 
See Fig. 6 for a graphical representation of the security library structure. 
The security library was integrated into both the ground software (ASIST) and spacecraft flight software (FSW). 
The data (telemetry and telecommand) will be exchanged through the TC and AOS protocols in real time. 
Telecommands will be generated via the ground system and passed through the security library thereby creating 
protected telecommands to be uplinked via the SCOMM simulator. The incoming data can then be analysed by the 
FSW using the security library and processed. Telemetry, sent from the spacecraft to the ground, functions the same 
way but in reverse. The FSW encrypts the telemetry using the security library and downlinks via the SCOMM 
simulator to ASIST, which is then decrypted and processed by the ground system.  
F. CNES Test bed 
Two different simulators have been developed by CNES. The first one was developed in house, at the on-board 
data processing laboratory. Written in C, it runs on a standard PC with Windows environment. It is able to simulate 
SDLS over TM or AOS links. It is split in four independent software modules, each module simulating one side 
 
Figure 7. Overall NASA Prototype Space-Link. 
 
 
Figure 6. NASA Test Bed Security 
Library Structure. 
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(Ground or Spacecraft) of the selected link (TM or AOS). The stream of data representing the TM or AOS link is 
exchanged between the Ground module and the Spacecraft module either by file exchange or UDP/IP link. 
Configuration files are used for setting all the SDLS parameters like key, authentication mask, etc. The simulator 
can be run in local mode, simulating both ends of the SDLS protected TM or AOS link by simultaneously activating 
the Ground  and Spacecraft software modules. Alternatively, the simulator can be used to model one side of the link, 
with only one module activated, the other side of the link being simulated by another agency’s simulator. This 
configuration was used for testing the TM link with ESA’s simulator (CNES simulating the Spacecraft side) and 
AOS link with NASA’s simulator (CNES simulating the Ground side, as depicted in Fig. 9). 
The second simulator was developed by a subcontractor under CNES supervision. Its purpose is to simulate the 
SDLS over TC and TM simultaneously. Running on a PC with linux environment, it is built with already developed 
software modules used in CNES operational satellite control centers, like TC generation and formatting, FOP-1 
engine (ground part of the COP-1 protocol) and SLE gateways. Modules were specifically developed for SDLS and 
spacecraft simulation. Like ESA’s simulator, the ground side implements a complete TC and TM chain, including 
SLE protocol. This has shown to be useful for testing that SDLS has no side effect to the SLE protocol 
(operationally used between the control center and the ground stations). Being able to simulate the TC and TM link 
simultaneously, it also allows for testing the COP-1 protocol in closed loop (retransmission requests of TC frames 
with errors detected being sent to ground via the TM link). Exchange of data between the Ground side and the 
Spacecraft side is done using files or SLE services. This SLE feature makes the Ground side see the spacecraft side 
through SLE services, exactly like in operational control centers. This feature could be used for connecting the 
simulator (Ground or Spacecraft side) to a distant simulator via Internet, doing “real-time” simulations. Having all 
the “Bells and Whistles”, this simulator is a bit tricky to configure, requiring fine setting of parameters in many 
configuration files. The Ground side part of this simulator has been used to test the SDLS over TC protocol. The 
overall setup is depicted in Fig. 8.  
G. Overall Test Architecture and Execution 
Following the completion of the local implementation and testing of the SLDS protocol at ESA, NASA, and 
CNES sites, the next step was to set up a cross-agency test bed to actually validate the interoperability of the SDLS 
implementations. CCSDS standards are only published after successful execution of such interoperability tests as per 
agreed test plan (See Section III.C above). 
 
Figure 8. CNES SDLS Prototype Infrastructure.  
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 One critical aspect is the exchange of data between the different test beds. In the case of SDLS, this includes 
configuration settings, for example related to the security association in use but also the binary TM, TC, and AOS 
frames themselves. Following a feasibility analysis, it was decided not to go for a direct on-line connection of the 
implementation test beds. The main reason for this was the many hurdles that a connection to an external network 
has to overcome. Thus, in order to avoid a long approval process for this and thus delay the publication of the SDLS 
standard, it was agreed to exchange the data using an offline channel. Secure email transfer proved to be the most 
practical approach in this respect.  In all tests, the original unsecured frames are compared are saved into text files, 
send along via secure email and then compared with the finally processed frames at the other end of the 
communication chain with the aim to validate that they are identical. 
The interoperability setup is split into two main test setups between different Agencies. ESA and CNES have 
tested the SDLS protocol based on the TM and TC SDL protocols3,4. The ESA reference implementation plays the 
role of the ground segment. It prepares protected telecommands for injection into the CNES implementation, playing 
the role of the space segment, to validate test cases 1 and 2. The same test is inverted for test case 3 (SDL TM 
protocol).  The second setup between the CNES and NASA implementations has been prepared to validate test case 
4 (SDL AOS protocol). The CNES implementation was selected to represent the ground segment side and the 
NASA implementation was used as space 
segment. Fig. 9. shows the overall setup. 
In all test cases, the processing of the 
SDL transfer frames between the three 
different implementations has been 
successful. Furthermore, all deliberately 
injected faults (e.g. bit flip, wrong anti-
replay counter value) were handled 
according to the specification. No 
interference with other protocols such as 
COP-1 could be identified. As a result, the 
interoperability testing campaign has been 
declared successful. 
IV. Lessons-Learned 
A. Technical Improvements 
While the interoperability testing was 
successful and the SDLS protocol baseline 
mode has been validated, a number of 
issues have been identified and will be 
considered as technical improvements for 
the future. One key aspect certainly is the 
limited flexibility of the offline connection 
of the test environments. A solution for this 
could be exploiting a cloud-based 
environment. Section IV.B describes in 
detail this possible evolution.  
Another aspect that was noticed during the execution of the test was the inability to run a large number of 
automated test cases. The executed test cases were enough to validate the protocol, however the capability to 
perform automated testing would have increased the confidence in the protocol. The exchange of configuration 
information has been noted to be inflexible, also due to the offline channel. However, in general, the test 
environment should be capable of changing the configuration settings on both receiver and sender side in a fast and 
user friendly way. This would have allowed further test cases beyond the baseline mode. Part of this will be 
addressed with the implementation of the SDLS Extended Procedures but even then a simple user interface to do 
this will prove very useful. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Overall Test Architecture. The first diagram shows the 
CCSDS TC part of the test architecture between ESA and CNES while 
the second diagram shows the AOS part of the architecture between 
NASA and CNES. 
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B. Cloud-Based Interoperability Testing 
 The success of testing the baseline mode of the SDLS protocol was not dependent on real-time connection 
between the participating agencies. The interoperability testing success criteria were met even though the transfer 
frames had to be emailed from one agency to another. This however will not be a feasible approach for future testing 
campaigns (i.e. SDLS extended procedures). In the past it has proven to be difficult performing point-to-point 
interoperability testing between two agencies due to the multiple layers of approval required to implement firewall 
change requests or create new VPN tunnels. A potential solution to alleviate these networking issues is to perform 
the interoperability tests in “the cloud”. For testing the SDLS protocol outside of the baseline mode, real-time 
communications between the agencies will be required. While the setup of such a testing environment brings a 
number of challenges, once in place, it could significantly simplify the interoperability testing not only for security 
protocols but for all CCSDS protocols.  Several approaches have been discussed for cloud based testing of CCSDS 
protocols but the participating agencies involved with SDLS testing (NASA, ESA, and CNES) are investigating the 
possibility of creating a specific SDLS cloud environment. Upon success, other CCSDS protocol implementers will 
be able to apply the lessons learned and approaches used for SDLS testing. Two approaches are being investigated 
for a SDLS specific implementation. The preferred approach is to utilize the same cloud provider but different 
virtual machines connected by their own private virtual network. The contingency approach is for each agency to 
deploy on their own separate cloud providers and perform the testing over public IP space. See Fig. 8 for a graphical 
representation of the two approaches. The conclusions to be drawn from performing the initial SDLS cloud pilot will 
provide a basis for the SDLS working group, and other CCSDS groups, to make an informed decision on the 
feasibility of using the cloud to perform interoperability of other CCSDS protocols/standards. 
V. Conclusion 
C. Conclusion 
In this paper, we described the Space Data-Link Security (SDLS) protocol and the security services it provides to 
enable the protection of space-links that are based on CCSDS TM, TC, or AOS protocols. We introduced the three 
different prototype implementations done by CNES, ESA, and NASA and their respective testing environments 
before describing the interoperability test and the test execution between these implementations. All four test cases 
of the interoperability test have been validated and the overall test has been declared successful. Thus, this necessary 
precondition for the publication of the SDLS protocol standard has been fulfilled.  
D. Future Work 
This paper focuses on the interoperability testing that has been executed for the baseline mode of the SDLS core 
protocol. The CCSDS SDLS working group is already in the process of preparing the SDLS Extended Procedures 
which will provide and formalize the auxiliary procedures necessary to successfully run the SDLS protocol. More 
concrete, it will specify procedures for security association management, key management, and security unit 
management. It will also define a new 
Operational Control Field for the TM and 
AOS frames that serves as a security unit 
reporting mechanism. The 
interoperability testing and validation of 
these extended procedures is much more 
challenging than for the core protocol. 
The main reason here is that this can only 
be done in an online setup. Also, it 
requires much more rigorous confidence 
testing to be sure that no interference 
with the main data-link layer protocols is 
created. The upgrade of the various 
testing environments to support SDLS 
Extended Procedures interoperability 
testing will be one central element of 
future work together with taking on-
board some of the lessons-learned 
identified earlier. 
 
 
Figure 10. Cloud Based Interoperability Testing. The diagram 
shows the two possible cloud setups that are considered as a baseline 
for future interoperability testing. 
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